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“If we were to ask the question: ‘What
is human life’s chief concern?’ one of the
answers we should receive would be: ‘It is
happiness.’ How to gain, how to keep, how
to recover happiness is in fact for most men
at all times the secret motive of all they
do, and of all they are willing to endure.”
(William James, 1902).
Enhancement is generally understood as
being intended to improve well-being. The
motivation to enhance is the desire to
change a person for the better. However,
even when increased well-being is the
motivation, it is unclear how to morally
evaluate any given intervention. Four
examples illustrate why any enhancement
intervention, including those motivated




Humans have always been fighting, with all
themeans at their disposal, against disease,
pain, and unhappiness, fighting to increase
their quality of life. There have been many
facts, fictions, and controversies around
the enhancement of brain functions in the
last 15 years. Ever since the debate started
new definitions of enhancement have been
proffered, often diverging from each other
and leading to debates on a wide field of
ethical and social matters (Parens, 1998;
Farah et al., 2004; Levy, 2007; Greely
et al., 2008; Schermer et al., 2009; Nagel,
2010b). Enhancement interventions come
in many varieties: there are manifold
methods, goals, motivations, desires, ide-
als, and values that can invoke heated
discussions. Moral deliberation reaches
from statements such as those put forward
in the President’s Council on Bioethics
report Beyond Therapy (2003) with an
anti-enhancement agenda mainly based
on arguments around the concepts of nat-
uralness and dignity, to arguments for
the moral obligation to enhance (Harris,
2005; Savulescu, 2005)1. This wide vari-
ety in moral evaluations partly seems to
be based on different understandings of
the very term. Although “enhancement” is
a notoriously vague term, a general con-
sensus of what is meant is often implicitly
assumed.
MOTIVATION AND GOAL: WELL-BEING
Here, I will attempt to further a partic-
ular understanding of the concept that
shall serve to improve mutual under-
standing of the different positions.
Furthermore, I suggest distinguishing
what enhancement is and how it is
motivated from how its usage is eth-
ically evaluated. Julian Savulescu and
colleagues distinguish various ways of
conceptualizing enhancement and pro-
pose a “welfarist definition of human
enhancement: Any change in the biol-
ogy or psychology of a person which
increases the chances of leading a good
life in the relevant set of circumstances.
(....) It singles out well-being as one
dimension of value that is constitutive of
genuine human enhancement.” (Savulescu
et al., 2011, 7). Brian Earp and col-
leagues contrast this welfarist approach
with the “augmentative functionalist
approach” to show how diminishment
can be enhancement (Earp et al., 2014).
John Harris elaborates on how enhance-
ment is about making us better people:
“Enhancements will be enhancements
properly so-called if they make us
1Peter Reiner provides a lucid analysis of how this dis-
cussion is deeply bio-political, and driven by strong
intuitions of those at the extremes (Reiner, 2013).
better at doing some of the things
we want to do, better at experiencing
the world through all of our senses,
better at assimilating and processing what
we experience, better at remembering
and understanding things, stronger, more
competent, more of everything we want to
be (. . . ) In terms of human functioning, an
enhancement is by definition an improve-
ment on what went before. If it wasn’t
good for you, it wouldn’t be enhance-
ment.” (Harris, 2007, 2ff). Enhancement is
understood as generally being for the better
of people. If it was not for an improvement
for the better of an individual we would
not call it enhancement. In fact, it is a tau-
tology to say “enhancement for the better”
as enhancement implies that it improves
a given state, a performance, a capacity,
an appearance, but also an experience, a
feeling and, importantly: one’s evaluations
thereof.
EVENWHEN IT IS FOR THE BETTER IT
IS NOT ALWAYS GOOD: MOTIVATION
DOES NOT EQUAL EVALUATION
A popular slogan about enhancement
is that it makes people “better than
well” (Elliott, 2003). Back in 1998, Erik
Parens asked: “is better always good?” The
problem actually is what “the better” really
is in the plethora of possible cases of
individuals in their unique socio-cultural
contexts. How to evaluate what is better
for a person, for his or her surround-
ing, or for the wider social context is
a central matter for the normative dis-
cussion about it (Nagel, 2010b; Racine,
2010; Glannon, 2011). Hence, it is use-
ful to inquire about the purpose of
the particular enhancement intervention.
Enhancements are usually not driven by
the motivation to have merely more of
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some capacity, but rather by the desire
to change for the better2. Restricting the
concept of enhancement to the addition
of capacities or augmentation of function
(Bostrom, 2009) does not do justice to
the rich variety of forms which enhance-
ment can take, and underestimates the
plethora of motivations of people striving
for enhancement. The goal of enhance-
ment is improvement. One can argue
whether one understands it as improve-
ment beyond the normal, or improve-
ment beyond the natural (Sabin and
Daniels, 1994; Daniels, 2000; Buchanan,
2008, 2011)—both understandings lead to
their own complex debates, and the con-
cepts themselves require more scrutiny
than this article can offer. Each view
comes with its problems, and the conse-
quent moral evaluations differ depending
on what people feel most committed to
(Parens, 2005). First and foremost, the
goal of enhancement is about what peo-
ple strive for most: “How to gain, how
to keep, how to recover happiness” as
William James put it in 1902. However,
while interventions may indeed be moti-
vated by the desire to increase flourishing,
it is far from clear that the interventions
indeed yield this increase in well-being.
This view does not imply a normative
evaluation of the enhancement interven-
tion in a particular case. John Harris states
that “enhancements per se are not ethi-
cally problematic: they are unequivocally
good, clearly ethical. Unless the down-
side can be demonstrated and is signif-
icant, enhancement has the moral high
ground” (Harris, 2005). While one might
agree that enhancement per se always
aims for something good, i.e., well-being,
the evaluation of an enhancement varies
between individuals depending on their
situation. The moral evaluation of the
intervention in specific cases does not
depend solely on the desired goal of the
intervention.
2I have argued elsewhere that “more” can even have
negative effects on well-being (Nagel, 2010a). This
refers not only to side effects and long-term effects but
also to the potential burden of increased responsibil-
ity. Responding to this, John Danaher has argued that
this objection does not justify the project to “forestall
or delay the enhancement” project (Danaher, 2013).
However, forestalling the enhancement project is not
the goal of expressing this concern. The goal is to
illustrate the need for closer scrutiny of the diverse
influences of enhancement on well-being.
ETHICALLY CHALLENGING EVEN
THOUGHWELL-BEING IS THE GOAL
The following examples should help clar-
ify the general notion of enhancement
as meaning “enhancement for the better,”
and demonstrate how this still leads to
complex moral challenges.
1) The usage of methylphenidate and
amphetamine products in children
for enhancement purposes, e.g.,
to improve cognitive functioning:
Despite the fact that data on side effects
and effectiveness is sparse, usage of
prescription medication for enhance-
ment is increasing (McCabe et al.,
2011; Smith and Farah, 2011; Kaye and
Darke, 2012). For pediatric enhance-
ment, one can assume that parents
act with the best intentions for their
children. They aim to foster their chil-
dren’s flourishing and often hope to
do so with some form of enhance-
ment. Thus, while striving for the
best for their children and thus aiming
at “enhancement for the better,” they
might still risk the child’s current and
future well-being (e.g., Urban and Gao,
2014). Over and above the individual
impact, there are many pressing social
issues surrounding pediatric neuro-
enhancement (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Graf et al., 2013).
2) Using neuro-technologies and psy-
chopharmacology to induce plastic-
ity for general-purpose enhancement:
Trans-cranial electrical stimulation like
transcranial direct current stimulation
and transcranial random noise stim-
ulation can be employed as tools to
induce neuroplastic cortical excitabil-
ity alterations (Nitsche and Paulus,
2011; Cohen Kadosh, 2013; Snowball
et al., 2013; for discussions see Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2012; Fitz and Reiner,
2013; Davis and van Koningsbruggen,
2014; Krause and Cohen Kadosh,
2014). Furthermore, the commonly
used anticonvulsant and mood sta-
bilizer Valproat has recently been
shown to induce plasticity, thereby
reopening critical periods for learn-
ing (Gervain et al., 2013). These
technologies seem to promise gen-
eral enhancement potential by target-
ing neuronal plasticity. They certainly
can be used for the better of the
users. Crucially, however, this depends
on the risk and side-effect profile.
Moreover, ethical questions go beyond
purely individual reasoning and must
consider normative questions related
to the values that a society wants
to promote. This requires a cautious
approach that can only be hinted
at here. Paramount is the realization
that “enhancement for the better” still
offers challenges that require ethical
reasoning.
3) Using psychopharmacological
agents to erase or modify memory:
Unpleasant memories diminish life
quality. Especially individuals who
have experienced trauma or shock can
suffer from horrible, haunting mem-
ories. Manipulating such memories
or their emotional intensity promises
to increase well-being. While critics
argue that for individual, social, and
legal reasons “routinely interfering
with the memories of trauma survivors
and witnesses is highly questionable.”
(President’s Council on Bioethics,
chapter 5, IIC, Schacter, 2001), the
motivation for even healthy people to
seek memory blunting (e.g., with beta-
blockers) is the desire to flourish. For
the purpose of the present argument,
the key aspect is this: Memory blunting
as enhancement may help well-being
but still requires ethical reasoning
(Glannon, 2006; Kolber, 2006).
4) Enhancing by amputation?: A partic-
ularly challenging case for describing
what enhancement could mean if one
strongly stretches the concept into
the realm of treatment, is an inter-
vention in cases of Body Integrity
Identity Disorder (BIID). BIID is a
rare disorder in which patients suf-
fer a complete lack of identification
with a healthy limb and obsessively
desire its amputation (First, 2005).
They suffer sometimes so strongly
that they will harm themselves to get
rid of the unwanted limb. In these
cases, amputation reduces anxiety,
relieves suffering, and increases the
amputees’ subjective quality of life.
Despite the unclear medical catego-
rization, and despite the fact that these
patients suffer from a disorder, and
thus interventions qualify as treatment
rather than enhancement, the dilemma
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is strong: There are patients with
BIID who can decide autonomously
for elective amputation that harms
their physical body but enhances their
well-being (Bayne and Levy, 2005).
Approaching such an amputation as
enhancement is provocative, shat-
ters intuitions, and thereby demands
clarification of what is meant by
enhancement.
HOW TO PROCEED?
Various situations of enhancement can
lead to more flourishing. However, this
does not foreclose ethical discussions.
Ethical dilemmas emerge even if the goal
of the intervention is increased well-being.
I agree with Erik Parens who notes that
“some (. . . ) think the term enhancement
is so freighted with erroneous assump-
tions and so ripe for abuse that we ought
not even to use it. My sense is that if we
didn’t use enhancement, we would end up
with another term with similar problems”
(Parens, 1998, 2). Clearly, there is still work
to be done to clarify what we mean with
enhancement. Future deliberation should
include two issues that have not yet been
considered sufficiently in current debates:
(1) Studying the nature of well-being, and
how it can be increased (Parfit, 1984;
Kagan, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993;
Scanlon, 1998), and (2) probing public
attitudes on enhancement to allow regu-
lation and political decision-making to be
nuanced and sound (Nadler and Reiner,
2010; Fitz et al., 2013). While working
on this, it is worthwhile to avoid clam-
oring for a binary position either “for”
or “against” enhancement in general, and
instead foster sensitive discussions about
the concerns and idiosyncrasies of each
different case.
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